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Abstract 
After the World War I Hungary got into a difficult situation politically and militarily, too. The European 
great powers with the help of Trianon Peace Treaty hurdled and prohibited to develop a powerful and 
modern armed forces. The political and military leadership decided not to comply some parts of the 
decisions. Accordingly, the forbidden air defence artillery was organized as well. This article describes the 
first steps of how the Hungarian anti-aircraft artillery was supplied with cannons for air defence until 
1929. 
Keywords: World War I, air defence, Hungarian military history, history of air defence, air defence 
artillery 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After the World War I no state could plan and organize their homeland’s defence without 
air defence capabilities. The aircraft did not only do reconnaissance during the war accompa-
nied by a courier service and fire command tasks but increasingly, the bombing of troops and 
objects as well. It became clear to all individuals and organizations dealing with military is-
sues that the heartland was just as vulnerable as the front. It only depended on the develop-
ment of their aircraft and armaments.  
The future of the winners’ will about air defence was evident. On the one hand, their own 
armed forces were equipped with these weapons, on the other hand, the losers were not only 
prohibited to manufacture air warfare system and compliance but the ban was also imposed 
on deploying eliminating weapons. Thus, the losers were not allowed to produce nor to ac-
quire anti-aircraft artillery. 
 
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY  
 
After the losses of the "Great War" and because of the Decisions1 of the Hungarian Peace 
Treaty, Hungary faced great difficulties. The latter deprived the country of the possibility of 
an active air defence, the former left a very poor legacy in the field of anti-aircraft artillery 
and aircraft equipment. Yet the experience of World War clearly demonstrated that the air 
operations will take priority over the next armed conflict.  
The Hungarian idea solving air defence problem included the followings:  
1. Passive defence from the land.  
2. Active defence from the land.  
3. Defensive protection/blocking by the shooter forces.  
4.  Counter offensive, by attacking and retaliatory bombing of the hostile air forces.
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1 The Vth part of the Hungarian Peace Treaty – Military, military shipping and ballooning provision - signed 4th June 1920 
prohibited to deploy an air force. As the Vth part 1st chapter 108th article stated that ’It is prohibited to use any troops which is 
not mentioned in the above annexed tables.’, neither air force nor air defence cannons could be „kept” by Hungary. 
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 Magyar Katonai Szemle 1932. lvi II. évfolyamának II. évnegyedéhez 5. Füzet, vitéz Szentnémedy Ferenc: A 
honi légvédelem problémái és korszerű légvédelmi gyakorlatok 110. oldal 
The making of the 1st point happened continuously but very slowly, because it cost a lot. 
For point 4, very strong bomber forces were needed, and Hungary neither then, nor later had 
them. For us, the 2nd and the 3rd points seemed to be the most appropriate to implement. Tru-
ly enough they were also expensive but at least they had the fastest results. The fighters in the 
anti-aircraft system were effective 
tools with high agility and also had 
the power to win a decision. 
However, until 1939, they 
failed to organize a monitoring 
system which was necessary for 
their activities and alert in time. It 
would have been difficult to pro-
tect the whole country by fighters 
because of the size of the area as 
well. The frontier problem also 
highlighted the issue of which ar-
mament could and should be used: 
"Because of the reconnaissance, 
the fighters cannot operate suc-
cessfully in 60-80km range. But 
the protection of a district requires 
a huge amount of cannon."
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The anti-aircraft artillery, however, had a number of advantages over the hunters: 
1. Quick readiness to fight.  
2. Permanent readiness to fight in any weather conditions. (If you have the necessary opti-
cal and beam materials.) 
3.  The ability of the long engagement.  
4. The greater clarity of reviewing fight.
4
 
Naturally, the monitoring and forecasting service was necessary for their work as well, but 
it was not as crucial as for the fighters. The two arms were equally important for the protec-
tion of the country, but in the field of national air-defence the anti-aircraft artillery clearly had 
to be prioritized. 
Their work was defined as follows:  
1. Making the aerial reconnaissance job difficult.  
2. Destroying the bomber aircraft.  
3. Supporting their own aircraft in an air battle.
5
  
                                                 
3
 Magyar Katonai Szemle 1933. évi III. évfolyamának II. évnegyedéhez 6. Füzet, Rákosi Béla ezredes: A földről 
ható aktív légvédelem jelentősége 98. – 99. oldal 
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 Sípos Béla: Honi légoltalom, 25. oldal, 1936. Békéscsaba 
Picture 1 5/8M air defence cannon 
(From Archives of Institute of Military History, Budapest) 
The statement of one of 
the soldiers of those times, 
major József Bálint, indi-
cates the recognized signifi-
cance of the weapon: "... 
there is no air defence , nor 
home defence without anti-
aircraft artillery.”6  Of 
course he also added that 
the tasks must be solved by 
the two arms together and 
none of them should be 
overestimated at the ex-
pense of the other. In terms 
of military applications a 
"Bombardier Code of Prac-
tice" got accepted (air de-
fence booklet setting out the 
principles). In this booklet 
the idea of placing the 
weapons in an even order 
was abandoned, and also 
stated that it is no use ap-
plying anti-aircraft artillery 
without making the centre 
of gravity – “it is pointless 
and a priori inefficient." 
The mixed use of tools also 
became a principle. There 
was another argument for 
strengthening the air de-
fence with cannons and later with defence guns: the money! The acquisition of air defence 
artillery assets and the operation was significantly cheaper than the fighter forces. Truly 
enough, their efficiency and mobility were significantly lower as well.  
The calculations and analysis of Laszlo Captain Frederick in 1940 also showed an accepta-
ble rate for the 20s.
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– The set up cost of a gun battery: 1.2 mP8 
– 8000 shots for 4 shot guns: 1.2 mP 
– Four barrel replacements: 0.16 mP  
– Total: 2.56 mP  
Captain Laszlo calculated about 0.5 million pengős for a plane, including thee tools and 
personal preparations. This was generally acceptable to the average, because an HE-111 cost 
800 000 pengős, an ME-109 400,000 pengős, an Ar-96 / B, 175,263 pengős in 1941.9 The 
                                                 
6
 Magyar Katonai Szemle 1933. évi III. évfolyamának II. évnegyedéhez 4. Füzet, Bálint József őrnagy: A földről 
ható aktív légvédelem jelentősége 116. oldal 
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 Magyar Katonai Szemle 1941. évi X. évfolyam 9. Füzet, László Frigyes százados: Gondolatok a légvédelem 
köréből, 762. oldal 
8
 “million Pengős” 
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 Szabó Miklós: A Magyar Királyi Légierő technikai és szervezeti fejlődése (1938-1944) 1981., 148. oldal 
 
 
Picture 2 O.M 14 anti-aircraft gun 
(From former artillery cadet’s textbook) 
 
prices above may be related to the prices in the 20's as well, as the production and mainte-
nance money in the armament did not change significantly. In his writing he calculated with 
1% efficiency (which turned out generally lower in the later military experience), so the dam-
age caused to the enemy could by 40 million pengős. The own expense of spent material and 
amortized guns was about 0.36 million pengős. This, of course is purely a theoretical calcula-
tion, however, when compared with the known data on this forecast, it turned out that it was 
not totally unfounded. In the battles of the 2nd Hungarian Army the 3 per thousand efficiency 
of the 29M type anti-aircraft guns was still very good.  
In 1920, the General Staff forecast that in a future war the air strikes would have a signifi-
cant role, and therefore they would have major implications for air defence from the ground 
as well. The military leadership therefore decided that - in contrast to the peace agreement – 
they would not give up their anti-aircraft artillery arms, but make it hidden. 
  
3. THE EARLY HUNGARIAN AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY 
 
Hungary didn’t have the necessary extent of professional subject matter for her own air de-
fence artillery. Only 2-bit and 10-bit 14 5/8M O.M. gun was available for the Army. In addi-
tion, the 14 O.M. tools were basically not air defence artillery weapons, they were only used 
in need for this task and they had low efficiency in it. The main part of the 14 O. M. gun were 
the tube, the breechblock, the middle-corner, the pedestal ring, the upper cannon pedestal and 
the gunner. The back funicular-tube device was able to elevate 50, and 70 degrees depending 
on the applied middle-corner. 
The most important technical parameters of the gun are illustrated on Table1.  
 
So the Army leadership decided, that despite the prohibitions they would set up and main-
tain one - at least minimally - operational anti-aircraft artillery of tools. Accordingly, in 1922, 
the Ministry of Defence decided to continue the production of the gun 5/8M, and they ordered 
20 pieces from Diósgyőr Gépgyár, which was later raised to 23. The guns were no longer 
modern, and they were very slow and difficult to move, however, the decision was motivated 
by the conceptual design possessed. This anti-aircraft gun consisted of a tube with cannon 
cradle, a upper cannon pedestal , a lower cannon pedestal and a pedestal ring. 
The 5/8M was a middle-cornered tool. In 1923, in the Military Major Group Chief Section 
it was decided that the guns would be applied on automobiles. The ordered material was pro-
duced by 1924. The technical parameters of the asset are in Table1., its limit of power is in 
Draft1. 
Table 1 
Type  
Typical 
14 O.M. 5/8M 
Calibre (mm) 76,5 76,5 
Total pipe length (mm) 2284 2298 
Projectile initial velocity (m / s) 500 520 
Elevation (degrees) -7 (-10) ÷ 50 (75) -7 ÷ 75 (85) 
Range (m) 7300 9360 
Range of high (m) 5000 4800 
Rate of fire (rounds per minute) 10 ÷ 15 15 
Transport Towed automobile, rail 
The danger radius around the deto-
nation point (m 
 25 
Bullet weights (kg) 6,5 ÷ 6,6 6,68 
Several solutions were experimented to modernize the gun and the additional instruments. 
The Technical Research Institute increased the elevation angle from 75 º to 85 º. Later, a new 
cannon sighting was attached to the anti-aircraft gun, because the original one was outdated 
and had low efficiency. 
 
4. DECIDING FOR A NEW WEAPON 
  
In 1928 it finally became clear that the national production of cannons did not bring the 
expected results. New problems occurred with 5/8M. The cannon barrels burned out quickly, 
mainly due to the poor quality of raw materials. The experiments on air defence artillery can-
nons of Technical Research Institute of Experimental neither brought the expected results. 
The 8.8 cm, 8.35 cm, 8 cm, 7 cm and 6.6 cm calibre guns in fact - except for the 6.6 cm - only 
existed on the drawing table. In the latter case an experimental piece was constructed in 1927, 
but its production failed because of the technical difficulties and the opposition of the Chief of 
Army Staff, because the lowest limit of the calibre was specified as 8cm!
10
  
Thus, the military was forced to seek for new solutions. According to the regulations of the 
Peace Treaty we were not allowed to buy military material, so a decision was made to obtain 
an authorization (license) for manufacturing.  
Out of the options, a Swedish 8 cm L/50 model was chosen, the later  Hungarian 29M anti-
aircraft gun.  
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800 m - Saját csapatok és javak biztonsága
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800 m - The safety of the own troops and goods 
 Picture 3 The range area of 5/8 M air defence cannon 
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